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Abstract— Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) consist of 
wireless mobile nodes which coordinate with each other to form 
temporary network without its pre-existing infrastructure. 
AODV is popular Ad-hoc distance vector routing reactive 
protocol which is used to find correct & shortest route to 
destination. Due to openness, dynamic, infrastructure-less 
nature, MANET are vulnerable to various attacks. One of these 
possible attacks is a Black Hole Attack in which a mobile node 
falsely replies to the source node that it is having a shortest path 
to the destination without checking its routing table. Therefore 
source node send all of its data to the black hole node and it 
deprives all the traffic of the source node. In this paper, We are 
proposing a technique to detect and prevent the multiple black 
hole nodes from MANET so that source to destination 
communication can be made easily. We also analysed the 
performance of the network in terms of number of packets sent, 
received, throughput, energy of network before attack and after 
detection & prevention of Attack. From these analysis, we can 
conclude that performance decreased due to attack can be 
improved after detection & prevention black hole attack in 
MANET. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) is a self-configuring 
network of wireless mobile nodes that formed network 
capable of dynamic changing topology. Each node in the 
network acts as a router, forwarding data packets to other 
nodes [1]. MANET have many potential applications such as 
military services in battlefield, disaster relief operations and in 
commercial environments. 
Routing in MANET is complex due to its mobility of nodes 
and dynamic changing topology as compared to traditional 
wired networks. Limited bandwidth and battery makes routing 
in MANET more challenging. Due to these fundamental 
characteristics of MANET, it is susceptible to various kinds of 
attacks like eaves dropping with malicious intent, spoofing of 
control or data packets, malicious modification of the packet 
contents and Denial of service attack like worm hole, sink 
hole, black and gray hole attacks [7]. These are all network 
layer attacks. So routing security is one of the important issue 
for which researchers want to contribute. Routing protocol 
plays vital role in security of the network. AODV is routing 
protocol designed and used for MANET to establish route on  
demand. It does not need to maintain routes which are not 
active. 
In this paper, We attempt to provides a solution to detect 
the multiple black hole nodes present and prevent them from 
the network. In particular , we are focusing on AODV 
protocol in MANET .This solution are not only provide 
protection mechanism against black hole attack but also 
consequently improve the performance of the network 
comparing with the existing approaches after detection and 
prevention of attack. The analysis shows that how severe the 
attack is and its effects on MANET.   
II. BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN AODV PROTOCOL 
Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing 
Protocol is used for finding a path to the destination in an ad 
hoc network. To find the path to the destination all mobile 
nodes have to work in cooperation using the routing control 
messages. There are three types of routing control messages in 
AODV protocol Route Requests (RREQs), route Reply 
(RREP), Route Error (RERR) used to find a path to the 
destination [1]. The AODV routing protocol uses a destination 
sequence number for each route entry. The destination 
sequence number is generated by the destination when a 
connection is requested to it. The principle of this protocol is 
greater the destination sequence number, fresher is the route 
[1]. Small hop count is selected at the stage when most of the 
nodes have same retransmission time. When the source node S 
want to communicate with destination D as shown in the 
figure1,it broadcasts RREQs messages to the neighbour nodes. 
These neighbours check their routing table whether there is a 
path to the destination or not. If it is not then they also forward 
RREQs of the source node until message is received by the 
intermediate node having path to destination or destination 
node itself. If the node having a path to destination receives 
RREQ, it send route reply message to the source node. In this 
way, source node select the shortest path to the destination 
node with the greater sequence number of route reply message. 
If any link break occurs then RERR message send to source 
node.                                                                                          
In Black Hole Attack in MANET, here we assume malicious 
node M As Source S broadcasts its RREQs to connect with 
destination D, all intermediate node check their routing table 
whether there is a path to the destination D. Here Node M as 
malicious does not check its routing table and send false route 
reply packet to the source S with greater forged sequence 
number [3] than expected that it is having a path to destination 
D. As malicious node M does not check its route table, this 
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reply reach the source node faster than the normal nodes [6] 
source node select this path and send all of its data to the node 
M. The node M receive this data packets and deprive from the 
destination node.As this packets never reach to the destination 
node D the attack is called as a black hole attack [2]. 
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Fig1. Black Hole Attack 
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III. RELATED WORKS 
     Author [4]  have  discussed  a approach where intermediate 
nodes have to send RREP message along with the next hop 
information. When the source node receive this information, it 
sends a route request to the next hop to verify that node which 
send back RREP packet has  a  route  to  the  intermediate  
node and to the destination node. When the next hop receives 
a further request from the source node, it sends a further reply 
message which includes the check result to the source node 
that it is having a path or not. Based on this information, the  
source  node  judges  the  validity  of  the route. In  this  
protocol,  the  RREP  control  packet  is  modified  to contain  
the  information  about  next  hop. After receiving RREP, the 
source node will again send RREQ to the node specified as 
next hop in the received RREP. However, this increases the 
routing overhead and end-to-end delay.Here intermediate 
node have to send route reply packet twice for single RREQ. 
In  this,  [5]  author  proposed  a  solution  based  on 
Intrusion  Detection using  Anomaly  Detection  (IDAD). It 
prevents  both  attacks  by  single  and  multiple  black  hole 
nodes. This mechanism assume that every activity of a user is 
monitored and abnormal activities of malicious node can be 
identified from normal activities of normal nodes.For 
detection of the black hole attack, this method having a pre 
collected set of anomalies activities ,abnormal activities called 
audit data. As soon as the audit data collected and given to the 
system it compares every activity with the audit data.If any 
activity is not listed in audit data , then particular malicious 
node would have to be isolated and remove from the network.  
But the  drawback  is that  if  neighbour  node  give  false  
information  then  this solution lead to more delay in MANET. 
IV.   PROPOSED APPROACH 
Aim of the proposed algorithm is to detect multiple 
blackholes in MANET and improves performance of the 
network in terms of throughput, energy which degrades due to 
the attack. The proposed algorithm is consists of three main 
steps. 
 
A. Initializing Source and Destination Node 
       Here first source node want to communicate with the 
destination. In AODV protocol, source node have a 
predetermined set of time for receiving RREP route reply 
packets from intermediate nodes or destination node itself. 
Source node analyse one by one. 
 
B. Analysing RREP Route Reply Packets 
      The source node broadcast its RREQs to neighbours, when 
they have the path to destination, they reply to the source node 
about the path information which contains destination 
sequence number, next hop, destination node. According to 
principle of AODV protocol, greater the sequence number 
fresher is the route. Source node select path through the 
intermediate node having greater sequence number. 
       Normal node reply with the sequence number to the 
source node. We are expecting a threshold value of sequence 
number to be 1000 which is any how maximum for the 
network having less than 50 number of nodes. Here, We are 
creating scenario where 25 nodes present in the network. But 
as soon as malicious node receive route request from the 
source node, it just send false reply with greater sequence 
number as compared to normal nodes to get entry in the 
routing table of the source node with minimum time. 
      As source node get the reply from black hole node faster 
and greater sequence number, source node chooses this path 
and it leads to black hole attack. So we are considering the 
route reply adaptive sequence number of each intermediate 
node to the source node about the path information of 
destination and compare it with the threshold value which is 
considered to be maximum of the number of nodes present in 
the network. The adaptive sequence number is calculated by 
using reply message with the help of time keeper register. 
 
C. Comparing the adaptive RREP sequence number 
with threshold value  
When reply is having sequence number greater than the 
threshold value in a particular time duration, definitely it is 
black hole node. In this way, We are detecting multiple black 
hole nodes one by one and black listed them so that in the 
future, they may not be participate in node discovery process 
in the network. 
V. PSEUDO CODES 
Step 1: Initialize the source and destination node in the 
network. 
Step 2: Source Node broadcast its RREQs to communicate 
with the destination. 
Step 3: Adding time register for calculating the adaptive 
sequence numbers of incoming RREPs to the source node.           
 S 
I1 
I2 
I3 
I4 
M  D 
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Step 4:  Comparing the adaptive destination sequence number 
with threshold value in a particular time duration. 
if(RREP_SEQ_NO > THRESHOLD VALUE) 
   Malicious Node = Node; 
   BH Node Detected, So re-routing the packet; 
else                
   Select the normal path through which source can                         
communicate with the destination node. 
 End 
Step 5: Select the secure route by choosing a intermediate 
node for transmission 
Step 6: go to step 3. 
Step 7: End.   
VI. SIMULATION  RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 
A. Simulation Environment 
 
For simulation we have used NS-2 (ver-2.35) simulator on 
Ubuntu 13.04 operating system and analyze with the help of 
Tracegraph application and Xgraph AWK scripts.The 
simulation results involves network topology with 25 nodes 
where there are different source nodes communicates with the 
destination node. Mobility scenarios can be generated by 
random waypoint model in terrain area 1286m * 850m.The 
simulation parameters are as shown in table 1. 
  
 
TABLE 1 
SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
 
Parameters Values 
Simulator NS-2 (ver-2.35) 
Simulation Time 20 sec 
Number Of Nodes 25 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Traffic Model CBR 
No of sources                                         4
Terrain Area 1286m * 850m 
Transmission Range 250 m 
No of malicious nodes 3 
  
                      
B. Simulation Analysis & Results 
 
We created scenario of 25 nodes MANET and divides it 
into 3 phases as MANET without Black hole attack, 
Blackhole attack on MANET and Detection & prevention of 
attack and simulated all this scenario with the help oNS-2 
simulator. We configure different source nodes 21, 20, 11 17 
to communicate with the destination node 18 at different time. 
Node 21 communication with the destination node 18 scenario 
black hole attack phase and after detection & prevention phase 
is as shown on simulation screenshots in figure 2 & 3.In figure 
3, source node send the data packets to the black hole node 1 
instead of destination node 18 through intermediate  node 15. 
 
 
 
Fig.2 Black hole Attack (Source Node 21- Destination Node 18) 
 
 
 
Fig.3 After Detection & Removal Of Attack (SN 21- DN 18) 
 
    The MANET without Black hole attack always performs 
better in terms of throughput and energy consumption. After 
Black hole attack, we also measure the number of packets sent 
by the source node, received by destination node by using is 
analysed with the help of Tracegraph application. In this , We 
compare and analyse the performance of MANET in all three 
phases. Our results shows that the performance degradation of 
MANET after black hole attack is improved in terms of 
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throughput after detection and removal of multiple black hole 
nodes from MANET. The analysis in terms of performance 
comparison of all the three phase is as shown as below. In 
fig.4 The Number of receiving packets at destination node vs 
simulation time of the network graph is shown. 
    In this graph, we can analyse that no of received packets at 
destination from different source decreased due to black hole 
attack but after removal of attack it increases. Green line 
indicates MANET without black hole attack, red line indicates 
black hole attack and blue line indicates detection & removal 
of attack. The result shown in fig.5 shows that energy 
consumption is more when we apply our detection technique 
for black hole attack. 
 
 
 
Fig.4.  No Of Received Receiving Packets at Destination node 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The simulation analysis and results showed that black hole 
attack is one of the possible severe attack that can be easily 
launched on MANET. Hence, the proposed algorithm to 
detect black hole attack not only correctly detect the multiple 
black hole nodes in MANET but also improve the 
performance of the network after removal of attack. Our 
proposed algorithm performs better in terms of throughput of 
the network with some increased in energy consumption of 
the network. So in future, we will try to improve algorithm in 
terms of minimum energy consumption. We have carried 
comparative analysis of different phases which shows that 
black hole attack effect on the performance of the network. 
 Nodes mobility can effect on the performance of MANET in 
terms of misdetection probability. We can considered this as a 
false positives and in future we will calculate misdetection 
probability based on mobility of nodes in MANET. We also 
emphasize that though the proposed algorithm is implemented 
and simulated for the AODV routing algorithm, it can also be 
further extended for use by any other routing algorithms, as 
well. 
 
 
 
Fig.5 Energy Consumption of the Network 
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